Andreas Juon

Minorities overlooked: Group-based power-sharing and the exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma

Abstract

Ethnic power-sharing has been accused of decreasing ethnic inequality in unequal ways: While benefitting larger ethnic minorities, it often tends to overlook the smallest groups. Paradoxically, ethnic micro-minorities may thus find themselves in even more marginalized positions in power-sharing regimes than under institutional settings lacking any mandated inclusion. This article tests for the existence of this exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma using a new group-based dataset that distinguishes between different types of power-sharing. The findings indicate that this dilemma indeed exists for ethnically-based, but not for more liberal types of power-sharing, which increase all minorities' political status in an equal, albeit less strong, manner. The article concludes that adopting one form of power-sharing or the other means not only prioritizing one form of equality over another, but also making a decision with severe political ramifications for the numerically most vulnerable ethnic minority communities.

Keywords

Introduction

Power-sharing is often as exclusionary as it is inclusive. Far from universally benefiting all minority citizens, in many cases its adoption risks including some minorities at the expense of others. This is especially the case in corporate power-sharing systems that rely on the explicit predetermination of ethnic groups between whom power is to be shared. Corporate power-sharing institutions, for example ethnic quotas, may increase the political status of minorities who find their 'name' on the list of groups targeted for inclusion, but exhibit none or even countervailing effects on those who do not.

The 'losers' of this selection of groups between whom power is to be shared are often a country's smallest ethnic groups—its micro-minorities. In many cases, they are excluded from formal power-sharing which often only extends to its main ethnic segments. While only recently appearing in the spotlight of the literature, examples of this particular 'exclusion-amid-inclusion' dilemma have been widely documented across different consociational systems (Stojanović, 2018).

Does power-sharing, then, trade in the higher political status of the main ethnic segments for the increased marginalization of micro-minorities? And would micro-minorities be better off with alternative institutions?

In spite of many suggestive examples, there is still a lack of evidence concerning these assertions. On the one hand, it seems unclear whether micro-minorities would indeed fare better in the absence of corporate power-sharing provisions, as the alternatives may well be even more exclusionary (Lijphart, 2008: 73; McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013). On the other hand, the merits of the main propagated institutional alternative, liberal power-sharing, have not yet been investigated either.

These normative problems and the continuing lack of comparative evidence call for a quantitative investigation of how different types of power-sharing institutions affect the political status of micro-minorities. This article starts such an endeavour with a discussion of the existing literature, showing that the exclusion of micro-minorities in power-sharing systems is a widespread, but under-

researched, phenomenon. Equipped with a new group-based dataset of power-sharing institutions, it then analyses these relationships comparatively. The results confirm the existence of an institutional dilemma: While corporate forms of power-sharing offer strong inclusive guarantees for the larger ethnic minority segments, they entail much weaker benefits for micro-minorities. In contrast, liberal forms of power-sharing exert uniformly positive, but weaker, impacts on all minority groups. The results thus highlight a problematic choice for institutional 'engineers': The adoption of a deeper form of accommodation for the most important segments or of a shallower but more encompassing one for all ethnic minorities.

Power-sharing and the political outcomes of micro-minorities

Micro-minorities in corporate power-sharing systems

The central goal of power-sharing institutions is to increase the inclusiveness of the political system for ethnic minorities. Scholars commonly cite four institutions designed to enable such beneficial results (Binningsbø, 2013; Lijphart, 1977): First, grand coalition provisions (executive power-sharing), prescribing the inclusion of "all" ethnic segments into the government; second, clauses mandating proportional representation across important political offices; third, veto rights given to ethnic minority representatives, which enable them to block legislation that they view as 'especially detrimental' to their interests; and, fourth, segmental autonomy which leaves decisions of exclusive minority interest to each affected group itself. Together, these four institutions are supposed to prevent the permanent exclusion of ethnic minorities from government (Lijphart, 1977).

Clearly, all four institutional components of power-sharing are relevant for the de-facto political outcomes of ethnic minorities. However, as this article focuses on government inclusion and as previous research highlights the diverging impacts of horizontal and vertical power-sharing (Cederman et al., 2015; Gates et al., 2016; Linder & Bächtiger, 2005), it limits its analytical focus to the former

three, horizontal, components. While leaving aside the investigation of autonomy to future research, this does not exclude from the subsequent analysis inclusive institutions that are based on territorial categories, such as territorial quotas for executive positions. Rather, these institutions are seen and discussed as part of the respective horizontal components of power-sharing.[1]

While these institutions aim to include 'all' ethnic segments, in practice, all-inclusiveness is not feasible (McGarry & O'Leary, 2007; 2008). In order for predetermined, or *corporate*, power-sharing institutions to work, a prior selection process is required: Institutional 'engineers' not only need to enumerate the groups to be included, but also to determine the relative influence given to each (Lijphart, 2008; McCulloch, 2014). For example, they need to decide which groups should receive parliamentary quotas and the number of seats that these quotas should encompass. Of course, such a decision creates both winners and losers. Indeed, the decision to institutionalize the power access of some ethnic minorities inevitably entails a decision to exclude others.

Micro-minorities have been a frequent victim of such institutional 'sidelining' in power-sharing systems. Micro-minorities are minuscule groups whose clearly lower population shares demarcate them from larger ethnic minorities. Frequently judged as not statistically relevant or as not forming part of a state's 'constituent peoples', they are often overlooked both at negotiation tables as well as in the power-sharing institutions that are drafted there (McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013; Stojanović, 2018), with the resulting political systems frequently resembling ethnocracies dominated by larger groups (Stojanović, this issue).

This exclusion of micro-minorities amid a greater inclusion of the larger segments has repeatedly given rise to criticism. Some scholars allege that power-sharing is forced to 'explicitly discriminate among groups on grounds like religion, language, race or national origin' (Steiner, 1991: 1551). Others find that such practices clearly 'conflict with the liberal individualist paradigm that underpins contemporary international human rights norms' (Wippmann, 1998: 232).

Prominent targets of such accusations have been power-sharing institutions that reserve important state posts for some minorities, while excluding others. The most prominent example is the rigid power-sharing system of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth: Bosnia). Under its 1995 constitution, access to several key state institutions, including the presidency, is restricted to its three 'constituent peoples'—the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats (Bieber & Keil, 2009). A successful court challenge by Roma and Jewish citizens, however, has resulted in the condemnation of this institutionalized predetermination by the European Court of Human Rights (McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013).

A similarly precarious state of micro-minorities has been highlighted by scholars as regards virtually every group-based power-sharing regime. Institutionalized restrictions to accessing political power also apply to German speakers in Belgium (where the cabinet is formally split between Dutch and French speakers), to the Twa in Burundi (where the highest state posts are exclusively shared between the Hutu and Tutsi), and to ethnically-designated 'Others' in South Tyrol (where citizens that prefer to remain unaffiliated with any of the three major communities are excluded from political offices altogether) (Bell, 2013; Stojanović, 2018).

In other cases, institutional restrictions on micro-minorities come in subtler forms. These rely less on explicit barriers, but implicitly grant micro-minorities proportionally smaller political influence. This is, for example, the case in Northern Ireland's regional consociation: While 'Others' are allowed to run for all offices, the existence of parallel majority requirements in the Assembly—requiring separate quorums of unionist and nationalist MPs—mean that the votes of deputies belonging to other segments have comparably lower weight (O'Flynn, 2003).

In addition to unequal legal treatment, existing studies also highlight problems of transforming de-jure into de-facto inclusion, which may disproportionally affect micro-minorities due to their comparable lack of political resources. For example, while Kosovo's consociational constitution relies on an encompassing list of ethnic minorities (Bieber & Keil, 2009), the targeted groups' ability to

enforce them has varied strongly. On the one hand, numerically larger ethnic minorities, such as the Serbs and Turks, appear to have profited; on the other, micro-minorities, such as the Gorani and Bosniaks, have persistently remained underrepresented (Krasniqi, 2015: 212). Similarly, while Lebanon's inter-confessional pact has benefited larger groups, smaller ones such as the Alawites, Druze (formally counted as 'Muslims'), and citizens counted as part of wide official category of 'other Christians' have failed to profit from it as well (Stojanović, 2018).

Micro-minorities in alternative institutional arrangements

While proponents of corporate power-sharing acknowledge the 'potential discrimination against [ethnic minority] groups' that it entails (Lijphart, 2008: 72), many hold that predetermination may often be the 'least worst option', even for micro-minorities (McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013: 490). Indeed, it may be impossible to reach any inter-ethnic compromise in the absence of group-based guarantees, especially after histories of violence (McCulloch, 2014). Instead of more inclusive political systems encompassing micro-minorities, the alternative to corporate power-sharing may instead well be either ethnic majority rule or prolonged ethnic unrest.

A potential way out of this dilemma may be alternative, liberal, forms of power-sharing. Similar to their corporate 'cousin', liberal power-sharing institutions seek to achieve a higher degree of minority inclusion. However, in contrast to the explicit predetermination on which corporate power-sharing rests, its liberal variant relies on indirect, mostly electorally-based, incentives. For example, it realizes executive power-sharing by using low electoral hurdles for cabinet inclusion or by relying on supermajorities for the election of important executive posts (McCulloch 2014; McGarry & O'Leary, 2007). Similarly, proportional representation can be achieved through proportional electoral systems with low thresholds, and veto powers can be indirectly encouraged by institutionalizing parliamentary supermajority requirements. In this way, liberal variants of power-sharing aim to include groups of

'whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections' (McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013: 484).

Lacking any explicit predetermination of accommodated minorities, the benefits of liberal power-sharing seem more likely to extend to micro-minorities as well. Consequently, calls to liberalize power-sharing institutions in order to improve the status of micro-minorities have become increasingly widespread. For example, in a concrete proposal to gradually transform South Tyrol's corporate consociation, Larin and Röggla (2016) outline a way of liberalizing it by making the ethnic 'Other' category more politically meaningful. Summing up evidence from a number of consociations, Stojanović (2018) similarly asserts that 'one way to solve the dilemma [of the "others"] would be to opt for liberal instead of corporate strategies for the implementation of consociational settlements'.

Despite such hopes, the benefits of relying on liberal power-sharing for micro-minorities seem far from clear. On the one hand, the fact that potentially workable alternatives to corporate rules 'can be formulated proves nothing about their feasibility' (McCrudden & O'Leary, 2013: 493). On the other, the question of how liberal consociations affect micro-minorities has so far, to the knowledge of the author, not been investigated at all (Stojanović, 2018) and there is doubt whether they entail benefits surpassing mere descriptive representation (Agarin, this issue).

Hypotheses: The effects of corporate and liberal power-sharing institutions on micro-minorities

Based on the literature cited above, the effects of de-jure power-sharing on micro-minorities' de-facto political inclusion can be expected to diverge between the corporate and liberal types of power-sharing. Within the former, corporate, variant, micro-minorities are likely to be disadvantaged in three different ways: First, they are unlikely to find their name on the list of groups targeted by corporate institutions in the first place. Second, even if formally included into a corporate power-sharing arrangement, they seem likely to lack the larger groups' political resources to translate de-jure into de-facto political

power. Third, the mandated inclusion of larger minorities may 'crowd out' micro-minorities from important political offices, whether they themselves are institutionally targeted for inclusion or not.

These expectations can be summarized in the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Micro-minorities are less likely to be targeted by corporate power-sharing institutions than larger minorities.

Hypothesis 2: Corporate power-sharing institutions targeting micro-minorities increase their de-facto political status less effectively than the ones targeting larger minorities.

Hypothesis 3: Corporate power-sharing institutions targeting other groups decrease the de-facto political status of micro-minorities.

While the overall effect of corporate power-sharing institutions is thus ambiguous for micro-minorities' political attainments, the arguments outlined in the last section lead one to expect that liberal power-sharing provisions should exhibit uniformly positive impacts on all groups, including micro-minorities. However, lacking the clear group-based criteria of corporate power-sharing institutions, liberal provisions seem comparably more difficult to enforce. Furthermore, often requiring cooperation between minorities to bear fruit, they are likely to be inherently less effective as well (cf. Lijphart, 2008).

These considerations lead to the formulation of two more hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4: Liberal power-sharing institutions increase the de-facto political status of all ethnic minorities equally.

Hypothesis 5: Liberal power-sharing institutions increase the de-facto political status of minorities less effectively than corporate ones.

Empirical Analysis

Having outlined the theoretical expectations of how de-jure power-sharing affects the de-facto political outcomes of ethnic micro-minorities, this section proceeds to their empirical investigation. It first presents a new, group-based dataset of power-sharing institutions and then assesses their effects on minorities' political attainments comparatively.

Measuring group-based power-sharing institutions

In order to enable a comparative investigation into the group-differentiated effects of power-sharing institutions, new data was needed. Some of the existing sources would restrict attention to post-conflict cases (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015) and none of them permits a disaggregated analysis on the ethnic group-level or a distinction between corporate and liberal forms of power-sharing (Strøm et al., 2015). The constitutional power-sharing dataset (CPSD, version 1.1) was created to fill these gaps.

Conceptually, the CPSD is structured along the three horizontal power-sharing components discussed above: Grand coalition provisions mandating the inclusion of minorities into the executive, proportional representation clauses prescribing their inclusion into the legislature, and mutual veto rights over constitutional amendments and legislation given to their representatives. Each of these components encompasses multiple institutions through which it can be realized (Lijphart 1977).

Using a combination of existing data, secondary sources and own, manual coding,[2] a total of 99 institutional power-sharing indicators was coded for 105 countries, covering most of the time period between 1946 and 2013[3] (see table 1 for an overview). All indicators are continuous and normalized to a range between 0 and 1. They were connected to specific ethnic minority groups, with the list of groups based on the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset[4] (EPR, Vogt et al. 2015): Ethnically-based

indicators (for example, ethnic quotas) were connected by name; indicators based on specific organizations (for example, quotas for former warring factions) by considering each organization's ethnic claims; country-level indicators (for example, the proportionality of electoral systems) were taken over equally for each group; finally, territorially-based indicators (for example, quotas targeting member states) were connected by spatially intersecting each territorial unit's geo-coded boundary with ethnic settlement patterns and adding up locally-expected outcomes onto the group-level (see figure 1).

[insert Table 1]

[insert Figure 1]

In order to use these institutional measures for the analysis to follow, they had to be further aggregated from discrete, group-based indicators into overall power-sharing indices for each group. The aggregation procedure was theory-based and followed Lijphart's emphasis that each component of power-sharing can be realized through different institutional means, while each component is necessary to realize full power-sharing (Lijphart 1977; 2008). As a result, a weighted additive aggregation procedure was used, which assumed full substitutability of indicators within each component but no substitutability between them. The weighting accounted for the differential importance of the three components, of which grand coalitions are clearly the most restrictive measure.

In addition to an overall power-sharing index that captures all institutional options, separate corporate and liberal indices were also created. For this purpose, ethnically- and organization-based institutions were counted as corporate, while electorally-based ones were coded as liberal. Lacking a clear association with either type, territorial based power-sharing indicators were split up between the corporate and liberal indices based on how closely territorial boundaries corresponded to each ethnic group. On one side of the spectrum, cases where a subunit's boundaries fully align with a group's settlement pattern were counted as corporate. On the other side, if an ethnic group is split into multiple, heterogenous units, most of the respective territorial indicator value was counted as liberal.

The result of these aggregation steps[5] are group-specific overall and corporate power-sharing indices and a mostly group-invariant liberal power-sharing index, all three ranging from 0 (no power-sharing) to 1 (full power-sharing).

Two exemplary cases can help clarify the logic on which the data is based: The constitution coded as most strongly following the corporate power-sharing logic is Belgium's. It grants the Walloon minority half the cabinet seats and puts in place proportional representation quotas both for them as well as for German speakers in the upper house. In addition, to pass vital legislation, separate parliamentary supermajorities are required of each linguistic group. In contrast, Iraq's constitution of 2005 (for the transitional period until 2009) is the one most strongly characterized by liberal power-sharing elements. Besides parliamentary supermajority requirements for the election of the presidency and for the promulgation of constitutional amendments, it also establishes a highly proportional electoral system.

Political status and micro-minorities status

Before proceeding to the analysis, two further data-related steps are necessary. The first is the creation of a dependent variable measuring the de-facto political inclusion of ethnic minorities. For this, the political status variable from the EPR dataset (Vogt et al. 2015) was used. This variable determines, for each ethnic group, the degree of power that it exerts over the central government. This nominal variable was transformed into an ordinal one with the following values: 0 (discriminated), 1 (powerless or politically irrelevant), 2 (junior partner in a coalition), and 3 (senior partner).[6] This dependent variable is clearly distinct from the institutionally-based independent variables: Not only are there many cases where de-jure power-sharing does not result in de-facto accommodation (for example as concerns Kosovo's minority groups), but, conversely, a high de-facto political status of a minority may also be the result of other, non-institutional factors.

Second, micro-minorities had to be identified. Somewhat pragmatically, an ethnic group was coded as a micro-minority if its size was less than half the one of the next larger minority group *and* if its size was simultaneously below 10% of a country's population (or if the next larger group was already coded as a micro-minority by the same criteria). This coding reflects the context dependence of each group's size. For example, in Kosovo, the Serbs are the largest minority, having a share of just over 5 percent of the state population, while all the other groups' sizes are below 2 percent. All groups except the Serbs are thus coded as micro-minorities, while the Serbs, as the largest minority, were not, despite having a very small population share as well. This coding seems to be appropriately close to the arguments and adopted classification in the qualitative literature (Krasniqi, 2015).

The resulting dataset codes for more than 20,000 minority group years between 1946 and 2013 both de-jure power-sharing and the de-facto political outcomes of ethnic minorities. It also records in a dichotomous manner whether a given group is classified as a micro-minority or not. Using this dataset, the paper can now begin with an empirical analysis of the relationships between these factors.

Descriptive analysis

In a first step, the degree to which micro-minorities are targeted by power-sharing institutions is investigated. Figure 2 gives preliminary insights into this and at least partly underlines the often-voiced concern with their frequent lack of formal recognition in corporate power-sharing systems (hypothesis 1):[7] In the subset where corporate measures are adopted (55 percent), micro-minorities appear to be excluded in almost half of the cases (22 percent). In contrast, liberal power-sharing measures (not pictured) are, not surprisingly, far more inclusive – either none are in place (44 percent) or they encompass micro-minorities as well (48 percent).

[insert Figure 2]

How do these de-jure political arrangements map onto de-facto outcomes for micro-minorities? Using the same four-fold institutional classification of corporate power-sharing institutions (but now

excluding non-EPR groups), figure 3 reports the 'average' political status of micro-minorities within them. The preliminary patterns broadly conform to the theoretical expectations: For micro-minorities, the existence of corporate power-sharing provisions targeting them is indeed associated with a substantively higher political status. In contrast, situations where only other ethnic groups are targeted clearly correspond to lower political inclusion for micro-minorities. Similar patterns can be observed for liberal power-sharing as well (not pictured), with somewhat weaker, but still discernible increases of political status if liberal power-sharing measures are adopted (1.08 as compared to 0.9 if none are in place).

[insert Figure 3]

Table 2 expands this picture by giving an overview on minorities' de-jure and de-facto status in some of the country periods with the highest average institutional power-sharing indices. In many prominent cases, the legal and de-facto exclusion of micro-minorities go hand in hand. For example, the German speakers in Belgium are awarded considerably less institutional recognition than the Walloons (1970-2013), which translates into decreased political attainments. Similar patterns apply to the Roma in Bosnia (1995-2013), the Albanians, Croats and Roma in Yugoslavia (1974-1990), and the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa in Sudan (2006-2008).

[insert Table 2]

While these patterns are already illustrative, their informative value may be limited, especially when considering the potentially large number of confounding factors influencing each country's decision to adopt power-sharing. It seems likely, for example, that the correlations between de-jure and de-facto power-sharing partly reflect inclusive norms or other country-specific factors that affect both decisions for institutional design as well as the political outcomes of minorities simultaneously.

Regression analysis

To control for such confounding influences, it is now time to turn to a quantitative assessment. In order to do so, a series of ordinal logistic regressions were estimated, with each minority group's political status as the ordered dependent variable.[8] To rule out the potentially problematic influence of country-specific, time-invariant confounders, country-fixed effects were included in all specifications. This enables the estimation procedure to focus exclusively on the within-country variation, comparing only the political status attainments of different minorities in a given country (and over time) rather than mixing together cases with diverging levels of baseline inclusiveness.

In addition, several time-varying control variables were also included. On the group-level, there are dichotomous variables measuring whether or not a minority is regionally-based, whether it has an ethnic kin state,[9] and whether a group is involved in an on-going conflict (all three based on Vogt et al., 2015). In addition, several time-variant control variables at the country-level are added: These include negotiated civil war settlements in the preceding ten years (Kreutz, 2010), each country's current gross domestic product per capita (logged), its population (logged),[10] the total population share of all minorities, and a dummy variable indicating whether a country was a democracy or not (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010).[11] In addition, a year variable is included to account for linear time trends (see the appendix for more details on all these variables).

Table 3 presents six regression models. In the first two, claims about the overall inclusiveness of power-sharing at the country-level are investigated. This is done by relying on country-averaged power-sharing indices as the main independent variables (weighted by relative population shares). Interestingly, while both power-sharing indices are positive in sign, only the liberal one is significant in model 1. Model 2, which adds an interaction of both with micro-minority status, indicates why: While larger ethnic segments are better-off in states using corporate power-sharing (indicated by the main term), this relationship reverses for micro-minorities (indicated by the combination of the main and

interaction terms). This is in line with the allegation that the inclusion of larger minorities in corporate power-sharing systems may come at the expense of micro-minorities. In contrast, liberal power-sharing systems exert equally beneficial effects on both types of minorities, which is in line with the arguments of its proponents.

[insert Table 3]

The following models investigate in more detail how the unequal attainments for micro-minorities in corporate power-sharing systems arise. The first hypothesized factor is the potentially unequal recognition of micro-minorities. In order to investigate this possibility, model 3 replaces the country-averaged corporate power-sharing index with each group's own particular index value. In contrast to the insignificant country-level results of model 1, corporate power-sharing as measured on the group-level is found to have a strongly positive and significant impact on minority empowerment. Taken together with the previous results, this indicates that unequal recognition indeed plays a key role in explaining micro-minorities' comparably lower inclusion within them.

The second hypothesized factor behind the unequal inclusion of micro-minorities is that they may lack the political resources to benefit from corporate power-sharing, even if inclusive provisions encompass them as well. In order to check for this possibility, model 4 introduces an interaction term of group-based corporate power-sharing with the micro-minority dummy (and the equivalent interaction with liberal power-sharing). While the model again indicates no significant difference for liberal provisions, the negative sign and significance of the interaction with corporate power-sharing suggests that micro-minorities indeed often fail to profit from corporate power-sharing provisions even where they target them as well.

The third hypothesized factor that may adversely affect micro-minorities in corporate power-sharing systems is that they may be 'crowded out' of office by other targeted groups. In order to test for this, a variable is added measuring the average corporate power-sharing of all other minority groups (as seen from a given minority). If such "crowding-out" mechanisms exist, this variable should exhibit

negative effects. However, while its sign is indeed negative, it fails to attain significance (although it is not very far away, p = 0.18). To test the more specific argument that this factor should disproportionately affect micro-minorities, an interaction term of this variable with micro-minority status is added in model 6. While the sign of this interaction is negative as well, it clearly fails to reach the required significance levels, which suggests that, *if* crowding-out effects exist, they affect all minorities equally.

In sum, these regression results are in line with several of the hypotheses this article has sought to investigate: Not only is there evidence that micro-minorities are often institutionally excluded from corporate power-sharing (hypothesis 1), but that they are disproportionately likely to fail to profit from corporate provisions (hypothesis 2). In contrast, the models indicate that liberal power-sharing includes all minorities equally (hypothesis 4), albeit in a weaker way (hypothesis 5). As concerns the assertion that micro-minorities are crowded out from office due to the accommodation of other groups (hypothesis 3), only somewhat weaker evidence could be found: While there does seem to be a negative relationship between a minority's political status and the degree to which corporate power-sharing targets other groups, this does affect micro-minorities disproportionately (cf. hypothesis 3).

The results for most other variables are in accordance with previous findings. Minorities involved in ongoing conflicts have a lower access to political power, while regionally-concentrated groups have a higher one. Somewhat surprisingly, the models indicate that the presence of ethnic kin-states has no significant effects. On the country-level, ethnic minorities are more likely to be included in democratic systems and if their combined sizes make up a large share of a country's population. Overall, these effects seem likely to arise from the additional leverage which these factors grant minorities when campaigning for political inclusion.

Predicted probabilities

As the interaction terms in the models are difficult to interpret and as the substantive relationship between them and the outcome depends on the values of the other parameters, figure 4 represents the attained effects graphically. It maps the cumulative probability that a minority attains at least junior partner status under three different institutional scenarios (based on model 5). As the effects are also influenced by the choice of the country-fixed effect, all scenarios are pictured for a selection of geographically diverse countries, which have been prominently discussed in the power-sharing literature. For the predictions, all other parameters were set to each country's values in the last year for which data were available, which is 2013.

[insert Figure 4.]

The first row of the graph illustrates the dramatic direct effect of corporate power-sharing on minority inclusion under the assumption that there are no provisions targeting other groups. As the strength of corporate power-sharing increases from 0 to 1, the probability of the targeted minority attaining at least junior partner status increases in most countries from around 15 percent up to more than 70 percent, although it remains somewhat lower for micro-minorities, especially in some contexts (for example, Kosovo).

However, this first scenario is unlikely to be a realistic illustration of how corporate power-sharing affects the political status of minorities, as it ignores the potential countervailing effects arising from institutions targeting other groups. The second row consequently expands on the first scenario by considering such influences, assuming that all other groups are fully accommodated by corporate provisions. While inclusion probabilities are lower for all groups, what is remarkable in this scenario is that micro-minorities now almost completely fail to profit from inclusive provisions targeting them.

The third row of the figure illustrates the uniformly positive but clearly weaker effects of liberal power-sharing provisions. As these provisions become fully institutionalized, the probability of a

minority attaining government inclusion raises above 50 percent in most cases, although strong inter-country differences persist (for example, in Kosovo and Nigeria, the predicted effect of liberal power-sharing remains almost negligible).

Conclusion

This article presents important new empirical evidence on how power-sharing institutions influence the de-facto government access of ethnic minorities. It does so by considering two crucial distinctions that have not previously received systematic attention: First, the institutional difference between corporate and liberal modes of power-sharing and, second, their uneven impacts on different types of ethnic minorities. In particular, the article has tested assertions that corporate power-sharing trades in the inclusion of larger minority groups for the further marginalization of micro-minorities. In addition, it has considered calls to avoid this trade-off by relying on inherently 'group-blind' liberal ways of accommodation instead.

Although not amounting to a full endorsement of this criticism levelled against corporate power-sharing, the present article's findings point to a problematic choice for divided places. While corporate provisions exhibit strong inclusive effects for larger groups, their overall impacts indeed points in the contrary direction for micro-minorities. Not only are micro-minorities often a priori excluded from corporate power-sharing, but they are less likely to make profit even if corporate provisions do extend to them. Furthermore, 'crowding-out' effects may further compound this unequal access to power, as institutionally targeted groups monopolize access to political office. In contrast to the uneven inclusion resulting from corporate power-sharing, its 'group-blind' liberal variant is indeed found to encourage the inclusion of all minorities equally. However, often lacking clear enforceable criteria and requiring the cooperation of multiple minorities to be effective, it is also found to constitute a weaker reassurance overall as compared to corporate power-sharing.

These findings point to no easy way of circumventing this particular exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma. On the one hand, simply increasing the inclusiveness of corporate power-sharing by extending its list of targeted groups to encompass micro-minorities is unlikely enough to ensure their equal access to political power. Lacking the political resources to transform de-jure into de-facto power and additionally prone to being 'crowded out' of office, they are unlikely to benefit much from such a corporate power-sharing 'plus' type of arrangement. On the other hand, besides likely being unacceptable to larger groups, the adoption of liberal power-sharing instead offers only weaker guarantees against majority rule overall. Indeed, the adoption of 'group-blind' accommodation may simply shift exclusionary tendencies: While levelling the 'playing field' between micro-and other ethnic minorities, such institutions may instead fail to effectively close the gap between the majority and the ethnic minority population overall (Agarin, this issue).

Taken together, these results indicate the existence of yet another normative dilemma for institutional 'engineers' attempting to build inclusive institutions in divided places: They are faced with the problematic choice between two institutional possibilities – on the one hand, corporate power-sharing provisions, which offer strong guarantees for reducing ethnic inequality for larger minority groups, yet do so at the expense of micro-minorities; and, on the other, liberal forms of power-sharing, which promise a uniform, yet much weaker, alleviation of status inequalities for all ethnic minorities.

Notes

[1] Territorial quotas for executive positions are part of the grand coalition component, territorial upper houses a type of proportional representation, and territorial veto rights part of the mutual veto component.

[2] Constitutional data stem from the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al., 2014) and were augmented by manual coding. Data on electoral systems were taken from the Institutions and Elections Project (Regan et al., 2009; Wig et al., 2015), the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001), Carey and Hix (2011), and the Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World dataset (Bormann & Golder, 2013).

[3] The indicators were coded for all constitutional systems for which the CCP has data, meaning there are temporal gaps for some countries.

[4] In order to account for power-sharing institutions targeting groups not on the EPR list, for example the Rotumans in Fiji or the Twa in Burundi, an 'other' ethnic category was additionally coded for each country.

[5] A detailed description of indicators and aggregation steps is provided in the online appendices.

[6] Instances of 'dominant' and 'monopoly' minority governments were discarded from analysis, as the present theory does not extend to such cases. In addition, there had to be at least two EPR minority groups within a given country year and at least one of these groups had to be coded as a micro-minority.

[7] For this figure, each group's corporate and liberal power-sharing indices were transformed into a dummy taking the value of 1 for index values higher than 0 and 0 otherwise.

[8] In the appendix, all models are re-estimated with government inclusion and discrimination as binary dependent variables. In addition, further specifications and a test of the parallel odds assumption are also offered.

[9] Within a given group year, if there is at least one kin group that exerts predominant control in its state (cf. Bormann et al., 2017), this variable takes the value of 1; in all other cases, 0.

[10] Data for both variables stem from the Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012) and were updated with data from the World Bank (2017) and augmented with data from Gleditsch (2002).

[11] As the data only cover the time period until 2008, the last known value was copied forward until 2013. Kosovo was manually coded as democratic.

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Figure 1. Attribution of power-sharing indicators to ethnic groups.

Figure 2. De-jure status of micro-minorities (corporate power-sharing institutions).

Figure 3. De-facto status of micro-minorities (corporate power-sharing institutions).

Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of minorities attaining at least 'junior partner' political status in different scenarios.

a) Corporate power-sharing (no corporate provisions targeting other groups)

b) Corporate power-sharing (full corporate provisions targeting other groups)

c) Liberal power-sharing (no corporate provisions targeting other groups)

Table 1. The horizontal power-sharing concept in the CPSD: Components and indicators.

| Component	Corporate power-sharing	Liberal power-sharing
Grand coalition	**Ethnic or specific organization appointment veto** for: Cabinet, HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker	**Appointment supermajority** for: Cabinet, HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker
	Ethnic or specific organization quotas or position linkage for: Cabinet, HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker	**Quotas or position linkage based on vote thresholds** for: Cabinet, HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker
	Ethnic or specific organization rotation rules for: HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker	**Rotation rules based on vote thresholds** for: HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker
	Territorial appointment veto (vote spread rules) for: Cabinet, HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker	
	Territorial quotas or position linkage for: Cabinet, HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker	
	Territorial rotation rules for: HOS, HOG, HOS deputy, HOG deputy, LH speaker, UH speaker	
Proportional representation	**Ethnic or specific organization quotas** for: LH, UH	**Electoral system proportionality for:** LH, UH
		Quotas for electoral minorities for: UH
	Territorial quotas for: LH, UH	
Mutual veto	**Ethnic or specific organization veto rights** for: Constitutional amendments, general legislation (LH or UH)	**Supermajority requirements** for: Constitutional amendments or general legislation (LH and UH)
	Territorial veto rights for: Constitutional amendments, general legislation (LH or UH)	

Notes: HOS = head of state; HOG = head of government; LH = lower house; UH = upper house.

Table 2. De-jure and de-facto power-sharing [selection of minorities].

Country	Group	Micro-minority	Period	Corporate PS.	Liberal PS.	De-facto status no.
Belgium	Germans	1	1993-2013	0.14	0.29	1
	Walloon	0	1993-2013	1	0.29	3
Kosovo	Bosniaks	1	2008-2013	1	0.29	1
	Gorani	1	2008-2013	0.98	0.29	1
	Roma	1	2008-2013	1	0.29	1
	Serbs	0	2008-2013	1	0.29	1
	Turks	1	2008-2013	1	0.29	1
	Other	1	2008-2013	0.57	0.29	-
Belgium	Germans	1	1984-1992	0	0.29	1
	Walloon	0	1984-1992	0.87	0.29	3
Bosnia	Serbs	0	1996-2013	1	0.14	3
	Croats	0	1996-2013	1	0.14	3
	Roma	1	1996-2013	0	0.14	0
	Other	1	1996-2013	0	0.14	-
Burundi	Tutsi	0	2004-2013	0.99	0.91-0.92	2
	Other (non-relevant)	1	2004-2013	0.14	0.91-0.92	-
Cyprus	Turks	0	1960-1967	1	0.28	2
	Other	1	1960-1967	0	0.28	-
Belgium	Germans	1	1970-1983	0	0.29	1
	Walloon	0	1970-1983	0.87	0.29	3
Iraq	Kurds	0	2005-2009	0	0.78-0.79	2
	Sunni Arabs	0	2005-2009	0	0.78-0.79	2
	Other	1	2005-2009	0	0.78-0.79	-
Yugoslavia	Albanians	0	1974-1990	0.97	0	1
	Bosniaks/Muslims	0	1974-1990	1	0	3
	Croats	0	1974-1990	0.92	0	3
	Hungarians	1	1974-1990	0	0	1
	Macedonians	0	1974-1990	1	0	3
	Montenegrins	1	1974-1990	1	0	3
	Roma	1	1974-1990	0	0	1
	Slovenes	0	1974-1990	1	0	3
	Other	1	1974-1990	0	0	-
Fiji	Indians	0	1997-2008	0.09-0.1	0.74	1
	Other	1	1997-2008	0.1-0.14	0.74	-
South Africa	Afrikaners	0	1994-1995	0.08	0.73-0.74	2
	Asians	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	Coloreds	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	English Speakers	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	Ndebele	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	Pedi (North Sotho)	0	1994-1995	0.09	0.73-0.74	2
	San	1	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	1
	South Sotho	0	1994-1995	0.14	0.73-0.74	2
	Swazi	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	Tsonga	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	Tswana	0	1994-1995	0.14	0.75	2
	Venda	0	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	2
	Xhosa	0	1994-1995	0.08	0.73-0.74	3
	Other	1	1994-1995	0	0.73-0.74	-
Sudan	Azande	1	2006-2008	0.18	0	1
	Bari	1	2006-2008	0.18	0	1
	Beja	0	2006-2008	0.99	0	1
	Dinka	0	2006-2008	0.97	0	2

	Fur	1	2006-2008	0.16	0	0
	Latoka	1	2006-2008	0.03	0	1
	Masalit	1	2006-2008	0	0	0
	Nuba	0	2006-2008	0.97	0	1
	Nuer	0	2006-2008	0.97	0	1
	Other Northern groups	0	2006-2008	0.07-0.08	0	1
	Other Southern groups	0	2006-2008	0.97	0	1
	Rashaida	1	2006-2008	0.01	0	1
	Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla (Arab)	0	2006-2008	1	0	3
	Shilluk	1	2006-2008	0.97	0	1
	Zaghawa	1	2006-2008	0	0	0
Ethiopia	Afar	1	1992-1993	0.57	0	0
	Amhara	0	1992-1993	0.71	0	2
	Anuak	1	1992-1993	0.57	0	1
	Beni-Shugal-Gumez	1	1992-1993	0.57	0	1
	Harari	1	1992-1993	0.57	0	1
	Other Southern Nations	0	1992-1993	0.57	0	1
	Somali (Ogaden)	1	1992-1993	0.57	0	0
	Tigry	1	1992-1993	0.71	0	3
	Other	1	1992-1993	0.57	0	-
Lebanon	Alawites	1	1946-2013	0.59-0.7	0.16	1
	Armenian Catholics	1	1946-2013	0.71	0.16	1
	Armenian Orthodox	0/1	1946-2013	0.71	0.16	2
	Druze	0	1946-2013	0.59-0.7	0.16	2
	Greek Catholics	0	1946-2013	0.71	0.16	2
	Greek Orthodox	0	1946-2013	0.71	0.16	2
	Maronite Christians	0	1971-2013	0.71	0.16	3
	Palestinians (Arab)	0	1946-2013	0	0-0.16	0
	Protestants	1	1946-2013	0.71	0.16	1
	Shi'a Muslims (Arab)	0	1946-1970	0.7	0.16	2
	Sunnis (Arab)	0	1946-2013	0.59-0.7	0.16	3
	Other	1	1971-2013	0	0	-

Table 3. The effects of de-jure power-sharing on minorities' de-facto political status.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Corp. PS. (country)	1.754	3.887***				
	(1.429)	(1.110)				
Corp. PS. (country) x MM.		-4.542***				
		(1.390)				
Corp. PS. (group)			4.049***	5.369***	5.603***	5.981*
			(1.166)	(1.423)	(1.469)	(3.074)
Corp. PS. (group) x MM.				-2.744*	-2.767*	-3.263
				(1.487)	(1.456)	(3.525)
Lib. PS. (country)	1.866**	1.469	1.781*	1.590	1.719**	1.709*
	(0.865)	(1.074)	(0.933)	(1.138)	(0.874)	(0.884)
Lib. PS. (country) x MM.		0.748		0.295		
		(1.577)		(1.615)		
Corp. PS. (other groups)					-2.062	-2.614
					(1.565)	(3.745)
Corp. PS. (other groups) x MM.						0.741
						(3.795)
Micro-minority (MM.)	-1.654***	-1.424***	-1.645***	-1.459***	-1.429***	-1.443***
	(0.270)	(0.418)	(0.278)	(0.449)	(0.309)	(0.296)
Transnational ethnic kin state (group)	-0.256	-0.236	-0.196	-0.194	-0.202	-0.202
	(0.290)	(0.284)	(0.269)	(0.265)	(0.263)	(0.263)
Regional concentration (group)	1.354**	1.288**	1.216**	1.169**	1.153**	1.152**
	(0.526)	(0.546)	(0.485)	(0.508)	(0.508)	(0.507)
Ongoing conflict (group)	-1.312**	-1.288**	-1.370**	-1.326**	-1.341**	-1.340**
	(0.556)	(0.555)	(0.580)	(0.572)	(0.577)	(0.577)
Negotiated settlement	0.049	0.092	-0.060	0.017	0.026	0.031
	(0.205)	(0.217)	(0.164)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.193)
Combined minority population share	6.678***	6.601***	6.258***	6.213***	6.463***	6.469***
	(1.333)	(1.329)	(1.445)	(1.492)	(1.353)	(1.355)
Democracy	0.549***	0.570***	0.517**	0.579***	0.588***	0.596***
	(0.208)	(0.211)	(0.208)	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.189)
GDP p.c. (logged)	0.111	0.111	0.084	0.080	0.127	0.127
	(0.197)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.197)	(0.205)	(0.204)
Population (logged)	-0.122	-0.144	-0.253	-0.277	-0.165	-0.163
	(0.278)	(0.273)	(0.276)	(0.267)	(0.280)	(0.281)
Year	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
y> =1	-16.525	-16.352	-15.749	-16.575	-13.526	-13.453
	(18.531)	(18.472)	(19.566)	(19.253)	(19.467)	(19.450)
y> =2	-21.228	-21.047	-20.538	-21.342	-18.297	-18.225
	(18.651)	(18.604)	(19.689)	(19.372)	(19.584)	(19.568)
y> =3	-24.373	-24.349	-23.797	-24.706	-21.673	-21.602
	(18.686)	(18.633)	(19.699)	(19.402)	(19.607)	(19.591)
Country-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N	20243	20243	20243	20243	20243	20243
R-squared	0.567	0.577	0.584	0.589	0.590	0.590
Chi-square	13961.240***	14336.000***	14588.880***	14763.670***	14818.460***	14821.470***
	(df = 103)	(df = 105)	(df = 103)	(df = 105)	(df = 105)	(df = 106)

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1; country-clustered errors in parentheses; corp. PS. = corporate power-sharing, lib. PS. = liberal power-sharing.