Andreas Juon

The long-term consequences of power-sharing for ethnic salience

Abstract. Does power-sharing reduce or increase ethnic salience? Drawing on social psychology, I identify two countervailing mechanisms that help reconcile previously opposed findings. First, prolonged power-sharing *practices* attenuate between-group inequalities. Thereby, they gradually reduce the usefulness of ethnic identities as 'rules of thumb' and decrease their salience. Second, however, extended periods during which individuals live under ethnically differentiated power-sharing *institutions* render ethnic identities more accessible and thereby increase their salience. To test these expectations, I rely on the most extensive collection of mass surveys used in the empirical literature on ethnic salience so far, encompassing more than 900,000 respondents from a total of 132 countries. I show that power-sharing affects individuals' self-identification and vote intentions in accordance with my arguments. As my findings are based on specifications that incorporate fixed effects at the group- and group year-levels, they are unlikely endogenous to the provision of power-sharing to groups whose identities are most salient in the first place. My findings have important implications for efforts to institutionalize peace in divided societies and for the literature on ethnic conflict.

Keywords: power-sharing, consociationalism, ethnic identity, ethnic conflict

Introduction

Salient ethnic divisions form a central concern in peace research. Some scholars have linked them to political violence directly (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005; Rothchild & Roeder 2005) or indirectly via democratic (Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1977) and economic challenges (Easterly & Levine 1997; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner & Weinstein 2009). Moreover, though by no means sufficient (Hale 2008), salient ethnic divisions are necessary for the formation of ethnic grievances (Cederman et al. 2013; Stewart 2008). Hence, they make it more likely that violent conflict erupts along specifically *ethnic* lines.

It is hence no surprise that ethnic salience forms a cornerstone in the debate on institutionalizing peace. Some scholars argue that reducing ethnic salience is either 'unrealistic in any reasonable time horizon' or 'only likely ... in the context of accommodationist institutions' (McGarry & O'Leary 2008: 74). Based on this reasoning, they recommend accommodating diverse ethnic groups, most notably through power-sharing. In contrast, critics warn that accommodation may harden ethnic divisions. Instead, they recommend integrative institutions that foster a 'single public identity coterminous with the state's territory' (ibid: 41-2; Lieberman & Singh 2012; Rothchild & Roeder 2005).

Given the centrality of ethnic salience to this debate, it is surprising how little systematic empirical attention it has received in studies on the most widely advocated accommodative strategy, power-sharing. Theoretically, some scholars refer to early research on consociational democracy in Western Europe and expect power-sharing to gradually *reduce* ethnic salience. Thereby, power-sharing might eventually even render itself 'superfluous' (Lijphart 1977: 228). In contrast, other scholars warn that power-sharing may 'freeze' ethnic identities and *increase* their salience. In this reading, power-sharing may even carry the seed of its own, potentially violent, demise (Rothchild & Roeder 2005). Empirically, there is only limited evidence to adjudicate between these opposed viewpoints. Existing research mostly abstains from studying how power-sharing affects ordinary citizens' attitudes (Farag et al. 2022: 15), including the salience of their ethnic identities. Conversely, a growing cross-national

literature investigates the determinants of ethnic salience but has so far abstained from considering the role of power-sharing.

In this article, I address these gaps. Drawing on social psychology, I introduce a cognitive concept of ethnicity into the power-sharing literature (Abrams & Hogg 1990; Hale 2008; Turner 1987). In this view, ethnic identities will be salient if they account for meaningful similarities and differences between ethnic groups (have high *cognitive fit*) and if they are readily available in individuals' memory (have high *cognitive accessibility*). Building on this conception, I theorize on two countervailing mechanisms whereby prolonged power-sharing affects ethnic salience. First, power-sharing gradually attenuates between-group inequalities in terms of political representation and economic wealth. Thereby, it reduces the cognitive fit of ethnic identities and decreases their salience. Second, however, some types of power-sharing politicize individuals as ethnic group members, render ethnic identities more cognitively accessible, and thereby increase their salience. This second mechanism is closely tied to power-sharing institutions which formally tie political representation to predetermined ethnic identities. Based on these mechanisms, I expect prolonged power-sharing practices to reduce ethnic salience over time. However, I expect this effect to be attenuated, and potentially reversed, if power-sharing rests on ethnically differentiated constitutional provisions.

Using globally representative survey data, I examine how respondents' exposure to different types of power-sharing over their lifetime affects their propensity to self-identify in ethnic terms and to vote for ethnically based parties. In line with my hypotheses, find that longer exposure to power-sharing practices, proxied by joint representation in the executive, is associated with reduced ethnic salience. Moreover, this association is most pronounced for informal instances of power-sharing. In contrast, ethnically differentiated power-sharing institutions are associated with *increased* ethnic salience. All my specifications incorporate fixed effects at the ethnic group year-level. Hence, my findings are unlikely endogenous to a pattern whereby power-sharing is provided to groups with the most salient identities in the first place. As they are based on more than 900,000 respondents from

132 countries, they also contribute to a growing cross-national literature on ethnic salience more broadly.

Concepts

I start by defining three key concepts. First, following much of the literature on ethnic conflict, I adopt a Weberian conception of ethnicity. This sees an ethnic group as a set of individuals that 'entertain a subjective belief in their common descent', based on 'similarities of physical type or of customs or both' (Weber 1978: 389). I hence conceive of ethnic boundaries as durable, with individuals possessing limited freedom to actively shift these boundaries on their own (cf. Hale 2008; Wimmer 2008). However, I expect individuals to identify with the ethnic identities circumscribed by these boundaries to variable degrees.

This brings me to my second concept, ethnic salience. This captures two key aspects of ethnic identification: First, the degree to which individuals prioritize their ethnic identity over alternative social identities, most importantly the nation (its *cognitive* aspect). Second, the degree to which individuals' political behavior, such as their vote choice, is influenced by their ethnic identity (its *behavioral* aspect). Both aspects are linked to ethnic conflict, most notably via the formation of ethnic grievances (Cederman et al. 2013; Juon 2023; Stewart 2008). Ethnic self-identification is required for relative comparisons of group-wise political and economic status, which underlie perceptions of injustice in the first place. Moreover, mass support for political elites that make ethnic claims is required for the politicization of perceived inequality, which links grievances to ethnic conflict.

Finally, building on Lijphart's (1977) concept of consociationalism, I conceive of power-sharing as consisting of three inclusive principles: The representation of minorities in government through grand coalitions, their proportional representation across state organs, and veto rights whereby they

4

can block legislation that violates their core interests.[1] These principles may rest on formal, institutional rules, but may also be informally practiced (cf. Bormann et al. 2019). For instance, they may arise from long-standing inclusive norms (e.g., Switzerland's 'magic formula') or from temporary post-electoral coalitions (e.g., Slovakia's 2002 coalition government which included a Hungarian minority party). Contrary to more demanding concepts of consociational power-sharing (Bogaards, Helms & Lijphart 2019), I conceive of these principles as mutually reinforcing, but not jointly necessary. Moreover, following Lijphart (2004), I conceive of grand coalitions, evidenced by the joint representation of diverse ethnic groups in government, as the most central of these principles.

Literature review

There remains fundamental disagreement on the long-term consequences of power-sharing so defined for ethnic salience. In the first place, one might doubt whether power-sharing meaningfully affects ethnic salience at all. This conception underlies arguments that see power-sharing as a 'fixed destination' for conflict management (Maphai 1996: 78, cited in McCulloch 2017; cf. McGarry & O'Leary 2008). It also informs analytical decisions to treat ethnic groups as stable units of analysis, taken in much of the cross-national literature on ethnic conflict. For example, while acknowledging potential shifts over long time periods, Cederman and colleagues (2013: 234), argue that 'where time spans are more limited ... the assumption of stable group identification makes a lot of sense'. While these arguments may well apply, they remain untested and theoretically contested.

An alternative view is that power-sharing *reduces* ethnic salience. Adherents of this second view often refer to Arend Lijphart's early work on consociational democracy in Western Europe. According to Lijphart (1968), consociational practices stabilized the Netherlands despite its deep divisions into religion- and class-based pillars, characterized by separate parties, schools, and media landscapes. An

---

[1]   Note that I exclude Lijphart's fourth principle, segmental autonomy, from my discussion. Similar to violent conflict (cf. Bormann et al. 2019; Cederman et al. 2015), its links to ethnic salience likely differ substantially from those of horizontal power-sharing which forms the focus of this article.

extended period of coalition government not only created cross-community stakeholders, but it also fostered a 'spirit of tolerance' among the wider citizenry, and gradually eroded the segmental pillars.

Building on this influential study, Lijphart theorized that consociationalism might similarly 'depillarize' other, formerly divided societies. According to Lijphart, consociationalism might, 'at least initially ... make plural societies more thoroughly plural' (ibid 1977: 42). However, in the *long run*, he expects it to 'depoliticize segmental divergences' and eventually 'render itself superfluous' (ibid: 228). There is indeed evidence that consociationalism 'depillarized' other Western European countries that were formerly divided along religious and ideological lines: Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland (Lijphart 1977; 2002; cf. Deschouwer 2006). Together with the extension of consociational theory to non-European contexts (Bogaards 2000), similar arguments have been advanced as regards power-sharing more generally, even where it stops short of encompassing all consociational principles and is practiced in difficult post-conflict contexts (e.g., Cammett & Malesky 2012: 986; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003: 320).

Despite these persuasive arguments, it remains unclear whether power-sharing reduces ethnic salience. First, while intuitively appealing, the process whereby elite-level moderation 'trickles' down to the masses and erodes segmental 'pillars' remains unclear (cf. McCulloch 2017). Second, it remains to be seen whether limited forms of power-sharing similarly reduce *ethnically* based divisions which characterize many post-conflict societies, as the full consociational 'package' did in Western European democracies which were often not divided along ethnic lines (Andeweg 2000; Lijphart 2002: 20).

Finally, it is possible that power-sharing, especially if it is formally institutionalized, *increases* ethnic salience. Summarizing this view, Pildes (2008: 173-4) argues that power-sharing institutions 'undermine the dynamic possibilities for how [ethnic] identities might shift and become more muted over time'. McCulloch (2014: 508) maintains that post-conflict power-sharing freezes 'a particular moment in time - indeed, the very moment at which groups are most polarized'. Wolff (2011: 1783) warns that power-sharing may 'entrench and institutionalize pre-existing, and often conflict-hardened,

ethnic identities'. Some scholars even assert that, by boosting ethnic salience, power-sharing institutions may increase the risk that violent conflict will resume 'at an even more intense level' (Rothchild & Roeder 2005: 2)

Studies in this literature highlight two mechanisms. First, power-sharing institutions may politicize individuals as members of specific ethnic groups (Lieberman & Singh 2012; McCulloch 2014). Second, they may empower hardliners who have vested interests in keeping ethnicity salient through polarizing appeals (Rothchild & Roeder 2005; Rosiny 2015). Thereby, they may 'ethnicize' even issues formerly unrelated to ethnicity (Murtagh & McCulloch 2021; Nagle 2016). These arguments are backed by evidence from numerous cases, such as Lebanon (Rosiny 2015) and Bosnia (Leonard et al. 2016).

However, many afore-mentioned studies again do not provide an individual-level basis for their hypothesized effects of power-sharing on ethnic salience (cf. Hale 2008). This makes it difficult to understand how power-sharing increases ethnic salience. Moreover, the evidence for this view predominantly stems from post-conflict cases. As ethnic identities may harden in response to conflict (cf. Besley & Reynal Querol 2014; Petersen 2002; Horowitz 2001), this makes it difficult to assess whether high ethnic salience in these cases is a consequence of power-sharing or the conflicts that necessitated it in the first place. Moreover, the relationship between power-sharing and ethnic salience may well go the 'other way around'. High ethnic salience may force policymakers to practice power-sharing in the first place (Cederman et al. 2015; McGarry & O'Leary 2008).

Cross-national research offers only limited evidence to adjudicate between these diverging views. There is a growing consensus that power-sharing contributes to peace, as given by the absence of large-scale violence (Cederman et al. 2013; Gurr 2002; Østby 2008; Hartzell & Hoddie 2003). However, the finding that power-sharing prevents civil war is not proof that it reduces ethnic salience, nor does it rule out the possibility that it maintains ethnic salience at high levels, especially where it is formally institutionalized.

A growing number of empirical studies directly investigate the determinants of ethnic salience. Focusing on individuals' self-identification and vote intentions, these have investigated how ethnic salience is shaped by violence (Besley & Reynal Querol 2014; Gibler et al. 2012), cross-cutting cleavages (Dunning & Harrison 2010), economic inequality (Higashijima & Houle 2018; Ray 2018a), electoral competition (Eifert, Miguel & Posner 2010; Flesken 2018; Higashijima & Nagai 2016; Huber 2012), colonial legacies (Ali et al. 2019; McNamee 2019), group size (Elkins & Sides 2007), and modernization processes (Robinson 2014). While this literature features increasing calls to investigate the impact of power-sharing (e.g., Ray 2018b: 278; McNamee 2019: 154), these have remained largely unanswered. Wimmer (2017) and Ray (2018a) provide evidence that ethnic government inclusion increases national pride, but do not investigate its long-term effects on more proximate measures of ethnic salience. Most recently, Horne et al. (2022) show that histories of co-governance foster positive voter evaluations of other parties, citing mechanisms that resemble Lijphart's 'depillarization' logic. However, it is unclear how these findings travel to ethnic power-sharing outside the stable Western democracies they study.

In sum, there remains profound disagreement on how power-sharing affects ethnic salience. Moreover, there is little cross-national evidence to adjudicate between these opposed perspectives, as few studies investigate the consequences of power-sharing on ethnic salience directly.

Theory

I address these gaps, and partly reconcile these diverging views, by introducing a social psychological concept of ethnic salience into the power-sharing literature. Following the social identity approach, which has long been dominant in social psychology (cf. Brubaker et al. 2004; Hale 2008; Hornsey 2008), I conceive of ethnic identities as cognitive 'shortcuts'. These enable individuals to decrease uncertainty, both about how they should perceive social reality and which actions are appropriate (cf. Abrams & Hogg 1990; Turner 1987). Following this approach, I expect ethnic salience to be driven by two main factors.

The first factor is an ethnic identity's *cognitive fit*. This captures how well ethnicity accounts for subjectively meaningful similarities and differences between sets of people (cf. Hogg & Williams 2000: 89). Following this reasoning, ethnic identities will be more salient if they have a higher fit, most importantly if they are associated with important status differences, such access to political office and wealth. This makes it more likely that individuals will assess their own situation in ethnic terms, form diverging policy preferences, and sort themselves into ethnically distinct social networks (Stewart 2008), as has been well-documented for economic inequalities (Higashijima & Houle 2018; Houle et al. 2019; Huber & Suryanarayan 2016; Ray 2018a). Ethnic identities will also be more salient if a group has been subject to identity-based threats, such as targeted violence (cf. Stewart 2008; Fearon & Laitin 2000), following which individuals are more likely to perceive themselves part of an ethnic 'community of fate' (cf. Hale 2008: 50).

The second factor is an ethnic identity's *cognitive accessibility*. This refers to how easily it can be activated by individuals, as compared to other, potentially 'more fitting' identities (cf. Oakes 1987: 127-8; Turner 1987: 54). An ethnic identity is accessible if it is available in an individual's memory, either due to prior activation or due to contextual cues (cf. Hogg & Williams 2000: 89). Following this reasoning, ethnic identities will be more salient if they are linked to perceptible attributes that shape individuals' life chances, such as region of origin, religion, and language (Bormann et al. 2017; Hale 2008). Moreover, they will be more salient where political parties engage in frequent ethnic appeals (Hale 2008: 39; Liebermann & Singh 2017).

Given the relative durability of ethnic inequalities and cultural markers, these considerations offer a social psychological basis for the view that ethnic identities should be reasonably durable (Hale 2008; Stewart 2008). However, they do not rule out that their salience may shift under long-term power-sharing. To the contrary, they suggest two countervailing mechanisms whereby power-sharing might affect ethnic salience: one whereby power-sharing reduces ethnic salience by decreasing the cognitive fit of ethnic identities; and one whereby it increases ethnic salience by enhancing their

cognitive accessibility (see Figure 1). As I argue in the next two sections, the first mechanism is activated by power-sharing of any type, whereas the second is closely tied to ethnically based (*corporate*) power-sharing institutions.


Figure 1. Theoretical framework.

Power-sharing and the cognitive fit of ethnic identities

First, I expect prolonged power-sharing, irrespective of its specific form, to gradually reduce ethnic salience. It does so by eroding between-group inequalities, which reduces the cognitive fit of ethnic identities. Almost by definition, power-sharing attenuates *political* inequalities between diverse ethnic groups by jointly including their representatives in government (Cederman et al. 2013). Thereby, it 'softens' one of the most consequential dividing lines that otherwise sharply separates different groups from one another.

Over time, power-sharing may even encourage members of diverse included ethnic groups to develop a sense of a *common, shared* identity. Representatives of included groups have fewer incentives to engage in ethnically divisive appeals, as lower between-group inequalities reduce the resonance of such appeals (cf. Cederman et al. 2013). Moreover, like inter-party coalitions (Horne et al. 2022), members of multi-ethnic ruling coalitions will, at least occasionally, defend common policy proposals. Experiencing repeated demonstrations of inter-ethnic cooperation, members of included groups may gradually perceive their interests as more aligned, and ethnic boundaries as less politically consequential.

Finally, power-sharing also gradually attenuates *additional* between-group inequalities. By providing diverse groups with substantive representation, power-sharing enables them to address various disadvantages facing them. For instance, it may improve their access to economic wealth (Bormann et al. 2021). As a result, power-sharing slowly erodes the association of ethnic identities with social, economic, and cultural status (cf. Stewart 2008). In turn, this makes it more likely that included groups' preferences over public policy gradually converge (Higashijima & Houle 2018; Huber & Suryanarayan 2016).

Through these processes, prolonged power-sharing gradually reduces the cognitive fit of ethnic identities and decreases their salience. Recent studies of Burundi illustrate these arguments. There, 'the political salience of ethnicity has strongly diminished' following the introduction of largely informal power-sharing practices in 2000 which were constitutionally entrenched in 2004 (Vandeginste 2017: 8). The implementation of power-sharing 'reassured members of all ethnic categories that institutions ... would not be used as instruments of ethnic domination' (Raffoul 2020: 12). This addressed Tutsi identity threats and reduced their perception of forming a separate ethnic 'community of fate'. Moreover, it encouraged the formation of multi-ethnic parties, which reconfigured 'political alliances at the levels of party leaders, candidates and citizens' (ibid). Through common policies and appeals, these alliances highlighted the shared interests of Hutu and Tutsi and reduced their perception of having diverging political interests. In turn, this incentivized Burundian voters to seek patronage from multi-ethnic governing parties, 'at the expense of [their] ethnic preferences' (ibid: 13). Thereby, power-sharing gradually reduced the ethnicization of individuals' social networks.

These mechanisms lend a social psychological basis to the view that power-sharing reduces ethnic salience. Importantly, through this mechanism, power-sharing reduces ethnic salience *regardless of its precise institutional form*. What is important is that power-sharing is effectively practiced over

prolonged time periods, which reduces the cognitive fit of jointly represented groups' identities. I summarize these arguments in a first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Prolonged power-sharing reduces the salience of ethnic identities.

Power-sharing and the cognitive accessibility of ethnic identities

However, my framework also suggests a second, countervailing mechanism, whereby power-sharing may *increase* the salience of ethnic identities by enhancing their cognitive accessibility. This second mechanism is closely tied to ethnically based (*corporate*) power-sharing institutions. Corporate power-sharing explicitly predetermines the groups that share power (Lijphart 2008 [1995]) and entails 'the constitutional entrenchment of group representation' (McCulloch 2014: 503). It mandates power-sharing practices through formal, explicitly ethnic provisions, such as government quotas for specific groups and veto rights for their representatives. Prominent contemporary cases of corporate power-sharing include Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon.

As corporate power-sharing institutions often rely on ethnic quotas or separate electoral rolls, they repeatedly categorize individuals as ethnic group members (cf. Hale 2008; Lieberman & Singh 2012; Lieberman & Singh 2017; McGarry & O'Leary 2008). Thereby, they reinforce the belief that ethnic identities form 'natural' political dividing lines (cf. Brewer 1997). Moreover, they often connect *additional resources* to ethnic identities, repeatedly reminding citizens of their ethnicity in everyday life. As a rule, they require the explicit 'assignment of individuals to specific groups' (Lijphart 2008 [1995]: 72). For example, corporate power-sharing institutions may require individuals to publicly declare their ethnic identity (McGarry & O'Leary 2008: 78). Alternatively, they may make access to resources, such as state employment, conditional on ethnic identities.

Finally, corporate power-sharing institutions also indirectly increase the salience of ethnic identities by reinforcing *political elites'* incentives to engage in within-group competition. Exclusively faced with challengers from within their own group, for example when competing over reserved seats, elites have incentives to press ethnically based demands (Rothchild & Roeder 2005;

12

Horowitz 1985; Zuber & Szöcsik 2015). In turn, these repeated appeals enhance the accessibility of ethnic identities among their group members.

These processes can be illustrated with recent studies of Lebanon. There, corporate power-sharing was constitutionally enshrined as a transitional measure 'to eliminate political sectarianism' (Rosiny 2015). Yet, ethnic salience remains high, as bemoaned by representatives of all major groups (Nagle 2016: 1150). Political positions in Lebanon are allocated on a strictly sectarian basis, which consistently categorizes citizens as ethnic group members during all acts of political participation. Lebanon's quota system is also connected to important social and economic rights and hence provides citizens with repeated, everyday reminders of their identity. For instance, legal authority over personal matters is devolved to sectarian authorities, including over 'marriage, divorce and child custody rights' (Nagle 2016: 1149). Finally, Lebanon's corporate power-sharing system creates incentives for 'sectarian entrepreneurs' to make ethno-centric appeals (Rosiny 2015: 495). Thereby 'antagonistic expressions of ethnic identity remain the key resource for political parties to mobilize support' (Nagle 2016: 1157).

Other types of power-sharing are less likely to increase ethnic salience through this second mechanism. Informal power-sharing practices, such as the norm of balanced linguistic representation in Switzerland's cabinet or coalitions with alternating Albanian minority parties in North Macedonia, do not have a formal constitutional basis altogether. The main institutional alternative to corporate power-sharing, liberal power-sharing, relies on provisions that do not pre-determine the groups that are to share power (McGarry & O'Leary 2008). Instead, it typically relies on low electoral hurdles for executive inclusion, proportional electoral systems, and supermajority requirements, as in Northern Ireland, post-apartheid South Africa (1993-1995), and post-Hussein Iraq (2004-2009). Liberal power-sharing institutions may sometimes encourage ethnic claim-making in electoral contests (cf. Murtagh & McCulloch 2021) and thereby increase the accessibility of ethnic identities. However, this effect should be much less more pronounced than for corporate power-sharing institutions, whereby the

state consistently categorizes citizens as members of their ethnic groups, connects substantial resources to ethnic identities, and frequently requires elites to engage exclusively in within-group competition.

An example that illustrates the consequences of both liberal and informal power-sharing for ethnic salience is South Africa. To facilitate the transition from apartheid, South Africa adopted a temporary, liberal power-sharing constitution in 1993. This gave all parties with at least 5% vote share the right to proportionate cabinet representation and required consensual decision-making between them. These provisions generated a unity government between the African National Congress, the National Party (the former white ruling party), and the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party. This generated cross-ethnic ties and trust between the diverse coalition partners; moreover, it enabled the smaller, minority-led parties to introduce limits on pure majority role in the new permanent constitution (Sisk & Stefes 2005). Following the end of formal power-sharing in 1996, informal inclusive practices have intermittently continued between these coalition partners at various levels (Sisk & Stefes 2005). Together with the still highly proportional electoral system, this has discouraged mobilization along ethnic lines and contributed to an overall trend of decreasing ethnic salience (McLaughlin 2007). Apartheid era legacies mean that racial consciousness remains high. Nevertheless, the political and economic salience of the racial cleavage has started to decline, owing to expansive affirmative action policies adopted in 1994 (Seekings 2008).

These considerations lend a social psychological basis to the view that power-sharing may increase ethnic salience over time. This countervailing mechanism should predominantly accrue under corporate power-sharing institutions, which explicitly tie political representation to predetermined ethnic identities. In contrast, liberal power-sharing institutions should be less likely to activate this mechanism, while informal power-sharing practices should not do so at all. The main observable implication of these arguments is that corporate power-sharing will reduce ethnic salience less substantially than its informal and liberal alternatives. Moreover, if it increases the cognitive

accessibility of ethnic identities more than it decreases their cognitive fit, corporate power-sharing might even *increase* ethnic salience. I summarize these arguments in two further hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Prolonged corporate power-sharing institutions reduce the salience of ethnic identities less substantially, as compared to informal and liberal power-sharing.

Hypothesis 3: Prolonged corporate power-sharing institutions increase the salience of ethnic identities.

Data

Ethnic salience

A systematic test of these expectations entails stringent data requirements. To avoid selection bias, attitudinal information on ethnic salience is required for both ethnically divided, post-conflict cases as well as more stable contexts. Hence, it would not suffice to rely on individual global surveys or multiple waves of one regional survey. Going beyond existing research as regards spatial and temporal coverage, I therefore rely on a broad combination of mass surveys.

To collect this information, I considered all conventionally used, freely available cross-national mass surveys and screened them for measures pertaining to ethnic salience. I included two types of surveys that contain such measures. First, global surveys, including the World Values Surveys (Inglehart et al. 2014), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) National Identity modules (ISSP Research Group 2010-2015), augmented by its spin-off, the China Survey, [2] and the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP).[3] Second, a series of barometer surveys covering specific world regions, including Africa (Afrobarometer Data 1999-2016), the MENA region (the Arab Barometer),[4] Asia (the Asian Barometer, and the South Asia Barometer),[5] Europe (the European

---

[2] The China Survey is a project of the College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University, in collaboration with the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University.
[3] Available at: <https://u.osu.edu/cnep/surveys/surveys-through-2012/> (accessed on: 17.5.2020).
[4] Available at: <https://www.arabbarometer.org/> (accessed on: 17.5.2020).
[5] Both available at: <http://asianbarometer.org/> (accessed on: 17.5.2020).

Social Survey (Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway 2002) and the New Europe, New Russia and New Baltics Barometer series (Rose 2010)), and Latin America (the Latinobarómetro).[6]

Using these surveys, I standardize question items that tap into the cognitive and behavioral aspects of ethnic salience. My first dependent variable, *ethnic identification (EID)*, takes the value of 1 if respondents indicated that they more strongly identify with their ethnic identity than with their national identity. It takes the value 0 otherwise. To obtain sufficient coverage across countries and years, for respondents belonging to regionally concentrated groups, I also considered question items that ask individuals to choose between their regional and national identity in my main specification.

My second dependent variable, *ethnic party vote (EPV)*, takes the value 1, if respondents indicated they feel close to, will vote for, or have recently voted for an ethnically based party, and 0 otherwise.[7] To code this variable, I connected its underlying survey items to the V-Parties Dataset (Lindberg et al. 2022; Pemstein et al. 2020). Predominantly relying on this dataset, I then identified any party that either has an ethnic support base or that promotes its group's cultural superiority. This serves to include ethnic majority parties as well, which may refrain from making explicit ethnic claims.

To analyze the relationship between power-sharing and ethnic salience, I attributed survey respondents to their respective ethnic groups. I relied on the list of ethnic groups used by the Constitutional Power-Sharing Dataset (CPSD, Juon 2020), itself based on the widely used Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (EPR, Vogt et al. 2015). To identify individual respondents' ethnic identities, I combined explicit self-identification questions asked in some of the surveys with information on respondents' settlement area, religion, language, and phenotype provided in others. In my main models, I only include individuals that could be attributed to an ethnic group with reasonably high demographic probability (≥80%) (see appendix 1.1 for details). Figure 2 shows the grand averages of

---

[6] Available at: <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp> (accessed on: 17.5.2020).)
[7] See Huber (2012) for a similar combination. Individuals do not know which party they will vote for are excluded; for individuals who state they will not vote for any party, I code this measure as 0.

respondents primarily identifying with their ethnic identity (panel a) and intending to vote for an ethnic party (panel b), according to these measures, in all countries included in my analyses.


Figure 2. Included countries and grand mean of dependent variables.

Power-sharing practices and institutions

Another major challenge is the measurement of different types of power-sharing which I highlight in my argument. To proxy for overall power-sharing practices, I use information on group-wise governmental representation from EPR (Vogt et al. 2015). I identify all years in which a group enjoys *joint representation*, evidenced by de facto government inclusion together with any other group. This fits well with hypothesis 1, which focuses on power-sharing practices irrespective of their specific form, and my conceptualization, which conceives of grand coalitions as their key principle (cf. Lijphart 2004). A limitation is that this measure excludes proportional representation across other state organs and veto practices (cf. Bogaards 2019; Bogaards, Helms & Lijphart 2019). Moreover,

the underlying EPR data only capture the government representation of 'politically relevant' groups. In my robustness checks, I show that my results remain similar when using a more expansive measure for power-sharing practices and limiting the sample to 'politically relevant' groups.

To measure corporate and liberal power-sharing institutions, I rely on information provided by the CPSD (Juon 2020). This provides separate, group-level indices for corporate and liberal power-sharing institutions. Mirroring my conceptualization, these indices build on Lijphart's (1977) consociational principles and measure the degree to which each group benefits from constitutionally enshrined grand coalitions, proportional representation, and veto rights. Whereas the corporate power-sharing index captures all provisions that rely on explicitly ethnic criteria (such as ethnic quotas and veto rights), the liberal index predominantly captures electoral measures (such as low electoral thresholds for executive inclusion, proportional electoral systems, and supermajority requirements; see Juon 2020 for details).

Finally, using both datasets, I operationalize instances of informal power-sharing practices. To do so, I identify all ethnic groups that enjoy joint representation, as operationalized above, but are not targeted by substantial power-sharing institutions of either the corporate or liberal type according to CPSD.[8]

Analytical strategy

Using these data, I quantitatively test my expectations. My sample includes a total of 973,080 respondents nested in 784 ethnic groups and 132 countries, although this number is lower in each specification due to the limited overlap between surveys that have information for both dependent variables. This extensive, globally representative sample enables me to address challenges of

---

[8] I consider the absence of grand coalition provisions and overall power-sharing index values below 1/7 as evidence that power-sharing is informal. 1/7 is the value a group's power-sharing indices would take if it enjoys (fully) mandated proportional representation in parliament, but no mutual veto and grand coalition rights.

selection bias by providing systematic information on ethnic salience across diverse contexts in all world regions.

However, my extensive, observational sample exacerbates another inferential challenge: the non-random assignment of power-sharing to different groups. Power-sharing, especially of the corporate type, is disproportionately provided to groups whose identities are already salient in the first place. Moreover, this often occurs at points in time when their identities are *most* salient, for example following conflict (cf. Wucherpfennig et al. 2016). Without accounting for these patterns, my analyses would be biased towards finding a positive association between power-sharing, especially the corporate type, and ethnic salience. Hence, I risk falsely rejecting hypothesis 1, which posits a *negative* effect of prolonged power-sharing on ethnic salience. Conversely, I risk falsely attaining support for hypotheses 2 and 3, which posit that corporate power-sharing reduces ethnic salience less substantially, compared to its informal and liberal alternatives, and may even *increase* ethnic salience.

Ideally, these concerns would be addressed by identifying (quasi-)random variation in power-sharing, which is not influenced by ethnic salience. For example, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) identify such variation for local caste quotas in India, while Samii (2013) does so for military integration processes in Burundi. However, such quasi-random variation is generally not available for large-scale policy choices, such as national-level power-sharing, especially of the corporate type (cf. Lieberman & Singh 2012).[9]

While I am unable to overcome endogeneity concerns in my observational approach, I combine different empirical strategies to alleviate them. Most importantly, instead of comparing different countries and ethnic groups with one another, I more narrowly compare individuals belonging to the *same group, in the same year*, depending on their exposure to different types of power-sharing over their lifetime.

---

[9]   However, see appendix 3.2.3, where I instrument for lifetime power-sharing, building on Wucherpfennig et al. (2016).

Variables for individual-level lifetime power-sharing

To do so, I first construct variables for each respondent's *lifetime power-sharing* of the respective type (joint representation, corporate/liberal power-sharing institutions, informal joint representation) by summing up the annual power-sharing measures of each respondent's group (see above) for each year of their life and dividing by the total number of such years.[10] I exclude pre-adolescent years during which respondents are less likely to be socialized politically and only consider years from the age of 12. Hence, these measures vary at the individual level, depending on respondents' year of birth, the year of observation, and their groups' degree of power-sharing in between. Formally, for an individual *i* of age *a* belonging to group *g* in a year *t*, they are calculated as follows:

$$PS\ (lifetime)_{iagt} = \frac{\sum_{t_0=t-a+12}^{T} PS_{gt}}{a-12}\ (1)$$

where PS refers to power-sharing of the respective type.

This captures the individual-level mechanisms underlying my argument well. Thereby, I expected individuals' prolonged experience with effective power-sharing to decrease the perceived cognitive fit of ethnic identities and reduce ethnic salience (hypothesis 1). Conversely, I expected their prolonged exposure to ethnically differentiated (*corporate*) power-sharing institutions to partly (hypothesis 2) or fully (hypothesis 3) offset this effect, as this gradually increases the accessibility of ethnic identities and boosts their salience. Table I lists the groups in my sample with the highest lifetime power-sharing values. Reassuringly, despite conceptual differences, these encompass the most important cases discussed in the qualitative literature on consociational power-sharing institutions (cf. Bogaards, Helms & Lijphart 2019; Farag et al. 2022; McCulloch 2014).

---

[10]   For all groups that newly enter the list of EPR/CPSD groups in a year, I consider the power-sharing values of their predecessor groups, including in predecessor countries.

Table I. Groups with highest scores of lifetime power-sharing indices in sample.

country	group	informal joint representation	liberal PSI	corporate PSI
Burundi	Tutsi	0-0.16	0.2-0.97	0.16-0.99
	Hutu	0-0.16	0.18-0.97	0.14-0.87
Nigeria	Yoruba	0-0.48	0.09-0.98	0.07-0.47
	Hausa-Fulani	0-0.48	0.11-1	0.07-0.39
	Ijaw	0-0.38	0.11-0.78	0.16-0.59
	Igbo	0-0.38	0.09-0.89	0.09-0.43
	Tiv	0-0.15	0.13-0.71	0.14-0.84
Switzerland	Swiss French	0	0.75-0.81	0.4-0.77
	Swiss Germans	0	0.86-0.88	0.26-0.7
	Swiss Italians	0	0.56-0.57	0.74-0.91
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs	0-0.2	0.08-0.3	0.15-1
	Croats	0-0.16	0.08-0.3	0.15-1
	Bosniaks/Muslims	0	0.08-0.3	0.61-1
Tanzania	Others Mainland	0	0.09-0.58	0.5-0.91
Serbia / Serbia and Montenegro	Serbs	0-0.23	0.04-0.28	0.48-0.97
	Montenegrins	0-0.2	0.04-0.28	0.56-0.96
Malaysia	Malays	0	0.54-0.81	0.43-0.66
	Chinese	0	0.58-0.78	0.39-0.62
Slovenia	Slovenes	0-0.24	0.01-0.29	0-0.91
Croatia	Croats	0-0.23	0.02-0.3	0-0.9
South Africa	Afrikaners	0	0.21-0.53	0.04-0.88
	Coloreds	0	0.2-0.56	0.04-0.68

Specification and controls

Second, throughout my specifications, I incorporate fixed effects at the ethnic group year-level. For individual i in country c, group g, and year y, my specifications take the following form:

$$logit(\pi_{iygc}) = \beta_0 + \alpha\, PS\, (lifetime)_{iygc} + \beta_1 X_{1,iygc} + \varphi_{yg} + \phi_i + \varepsilon_{igyc} \quad (2)$$

This is a logistic regression that examines the effects of respondents' *lifetime power-sharing*, of different types. $y_{igyc}(\sim Binomial\,(\pi_{igyc}, 1))$ are my dependent variables, *EID* and *EPV*, as operationalized in the last section.

The ethnic *group year*-fixed effect (φ_{yg}) controls for unobserved group-level confounders that vary over time, such as a group's cultural distinctiveness, its visibility, its connections to governing elites, and its conflict history, which correspond to the most prominently discussed determinants of both power-sharing and ethnic salience (cf. Hale 2008; Lieberman & Singh 2012; Wucherpfennig et al. 2016). To account for the combination of differently worded survey items, I incorporate a survey-fixed effect (ϕ_i).

At the individual-level, $X_{1,igyc}$ controls for instances of prolonged single rule, which predominantly captures ethnic majority and core groups, whose ethnic salience is likely lower than members of politically non-dominant minorities. This vector also accounts for two important alternative mechanisms. First, as in Bosnia, power-sharing is often provided in the wake of prolonged conflict, which may itself shape ethnic salience. Second, power-sharing, especially if constitutionally entrenched, increases the risk of governmental gridlock. In turn, dissatisfaction with governmental performance may increase ethnic salience by incentivizing opportunistic elites to make divisive appeals and by increasing these elites' appeal to dissatisfied citizens. To account for these alternative mechanisms, I control for the number of years that an individual's group has been involved in civil war during their lifetime (Vogt et al. 2015) and for the mean governmental effectiveness an individual has experienced during their lifetime (Dahlberg et al. 2023). I also include standard demographic controls for respondents' *age*, *gender* (1 if female, 0 otherwise), and *high education* levels (1 if tertiary or higher, 0 otherwise).

Analysis

Main analyses

Table II shows my results. Models 1 and 2 test hypothesis 1 by examining the effect of overall power-sharing practices, proxied by the joint representation of individuals' group during their lifetime. Models 3 and 4 test hypotheses 2 and 3 by distinguishing between informal power-sharing practices and corporate/liberal power-sharing institutions. As the substantive relationships indicated by the logistic coefficients are difficult to interpret, I visualize them using average marginal effects for observed values (see Figure 3).

In line with hypothesis 1, I find that respondents are less likely to privilege their ethnic over their national identity (Model 1) and to vote for ethnically based parties (Model 2), the longer they have experienced de facto joint representation during their lifetime. The attained coefficient and effect estimates for this term (Figure 3, lines 1-2) are likely conservative, as they exclusively capture

individual differences around the group mean in a given year, while omitting variance between different groups and countries. Moreover, as stated above, power-sharing is often provided to ethnic groups precisely at points in time when their ethnic identities are most salient in the first place. Considering this, the attained associations are substantial and offer strong evidence that prolonged power-sharing indeed reduces ethnic salience over time.

In line with hypothesis 2, Models 3 and 4 highlight important differences between different types of power-sharing (Figure 3, lines 3-8). I find that informal joint representation most substantially reduces ethnic salience. While my liberal power-sharing measures also have a negative coefficient, this remains statistically non-significant (p = 0.26 and p = 0.91, respectively). Finally, in line with hypothesis 3, I find a *positive* and statistically significant association between prolonged corporate power-sharing and ethnic salience. In line with hypothesis 3, this indicates that, at least in my sample, the effect of corporate power-sharing on the cognitive accessibility of ethnic identities outweighs its effect on their cognitive fit.


Figure 3. Marginal effects of different types of lifetime power-sharing on the probability of ethnic identification (*EID*) and ethnic party vote (*EPV*), based on Models 1-4 in Table II.

Table II. Prolonged power-sharing and ethnic salience: main analyses.

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Dependent variable:	*EID*	*EPV*	*EID*	*EPV*
De facto joint representation (lifetime)	-0.187***	-0.153**		
	(0.048)	(0.057)		
De facto joint representation (informal, lifetime)			-0.163†	-0.237*
			(0.086)	(0.103)
De jure liberal PSI (lifetime)			-0.128	-0.017
			(0.116)	(0.143)
De jure corporate PSI (lifetime)			0.235***	0.334***
			(0.070)	(0.087)
De facto single rule (lifetime)	-0.259***	-0.242***		
	(0.057)	(0.065)		
De facto single rule (informal, lifetime)			-0.225***	-0.145†
			(0.065)	(0.078)
Conflict years (lifetime)	-0.001	-0.012**	0.002	-0.010*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Government effectiveness (lifetime)	0.254	0.156	0.307†	0.128
	(0.167)	(0.124)	(0.167)	(0.125)
Age	-0.002***	0.002***	-0.002***	0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Gender	0.075***	-0.102***	0.074***	-0.103***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
High education level	-0.240***	-0.310***	-0.240***	-0.310***
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Group year-FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey-FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	343,776	656,430	343,776	656,430
Squared Cor.	0.39536	0.53959	0.39544	0.53966
Pseudo R2	0.35085	0.50717	0.35089	0.50722
BIC	273,471.8	447,514.3	273,480.6	447,500.0

†< 0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; group birthyear-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

Robustness checks

I conduct several checks to probe the robustness of my results. First, a central motivation for my analysis has been to ascertain whether power-sharing reduces ethnic salience in contexts that are characterized by deep ethnic divisions and post-conflict legacies. In additional analyses, I show that

my findings are robust to limiting my sample to multi-ethnic countries with at least 5% minority population (Vogt et al. 2015) and countries with recent ethnic contestations (Germann & Sambanis 2021; Vogt et al. 2015) (appendix 3.1).

Second, I further probe the susceptibility of my findings to endogeneity (appendix 3.2). As discussed above, my results likely underestimate support for hypothesis 1, while they are at risk of falsely supporting hypotheses 2 and 3. I address these concerns by incorporating additional controls for developments during individuals' lifetime that might make the introduction of power-sharing more likely, including ethnic self-determination movements and past targeted discrimination. Moreover, I estimate the effects of power-sharing 'at the margin' by limiting my sample to those groups that are 'politically relevant' in a given year according to EPR (Vogt et al. 2015) and those that were ever targeted by corporate power-sharing. Finally, instead of employing group year-fixed effects, I instrument for *de facto government representation (lifetime)*, broadly following the approach by Wucherpfennig and colleagues (2016). Reassuringly, none of these procedures substantially alter my results.

Third, an important limitation of my operationalization of power-sharing practices is that this only captured instances of joint representation in the executive. This omits potential synergies of the grand coalition principle with other inclusive practices, proportional representation and mutual veto rights. To address this limitation, I show that my findings remain robust to a more extensive measure for power-sharing practices which also considers ethnic representativeness in the legislature, unity governments, and oversized party coalitions (appendix 3.3).

In appendices 3.4-3.6, I present additional robustness checks, including different dependent variable operationalizations, alternative specifications, separate models for my power-sharing variables, different criteria whereby I include respondents, an alternative estimation strategy using hierarchical logistic models, and a group-level measure for gradually accumulating power-sharing stocks. Altogether, my results remain remarkably robust. One important limitation that emerges,

however, is that the statistical significance of my *corporate power-sharing (lifetime)* variable on *EID* depends on using the full variance provided by combining its diverse, and heterogeneous, underlying survey items. This suggests the need to investigate the impact of power-sharing on ethnic self-identification further with other well-suited measures that are available across a representative set of cases.

Conclusion

This article set out to shed new light on one of the most enduring and controversial debates in the literature on institutionalizing lasting peace in ethnically divided societies: the question of whether prolonged power-sharing reduces or increases ethnic salience. Previous research offers support for both views but has remained implicit on the mechanisms involved and only offered limited cross-national evidence for or against these claims.

My theoretical framework partly reconciles both views, by distinguishing between two countervailing mechanisms whereby power-sharing may shape ethnic salience in the long-term. First, prolonged power-sharing attenuates between-group inequalities, for instance in terms of political status and economic wealth. Thereby, it gradually decreases the value of ethnic identities as 'rules of thumb' and reduces their salience. Second, however, where inclusion is mandated through ethnically based, *corporate power-sharing institutions*, these institutions repeatedly categorize individuals as ethnic group members. This gradually increases the accessibility of ethnic identities in individuals' memory and bolsters their salience. As a result, I expected informal forms of power-sharing to reduce ethnic salience most substantially, while this effect should be attenuated, or even reversed, for corporate power-sharing institutions.

To test these arguments, I have presented evidence from one of the most extensive data sets containing cross-national, attitudinal information on ethnic salience. In line with my argument, prolonged informal power-sharing practices, proxied by the prolonged joint governmental representation of ethnic representatives over an individual's lifetime, are associated with lower ethnic

salience. Conversely, I attained only an inconsistent association for electorally based, liberal power-sharing institutions, while prolonged individual exposure to corporate power-sharing institutions is associated with *higher* ethnic salience.

Following up on these findings, future research should consider in more detail different types of informal power-sharing practices, beyond the descriptive representation of ethnic groups in government (cf. Bogaards, Helms & Lijphart 2019). Moreover, it might consider how other accommodative strategies, such as regional autonomy, multiculturalism, and economic redistribution affect ethnic salience. My hypothesized mechanisms suggest that these should similarly affect ethnic salience, for example by attenuating horizontal inequalities (cf. Stewart 2008). In addition, future research should investigate the conditions under which different types of power-sharing can be substituted for one another. This question is relevant especially for post-conflict contexts, in which minorities frequently demand rigid and ethnically explicit corporate power-sharing institutions. However, in the long-term, the very same institutions reinforce ethnic salience, which is required for the eruption of violent conflict along specifically ethnic lines (cf. Cederman 2013; Hale 2008; Stewart 2008). Relatedly, future research should explore in more detail than has been possible in this article the potentially contingent connections between ethnic salience and different types of ethnic conflict.

All in all, this study suggests that prolonged power-sharing leaves a lasting imprint on ethnic salience in heterogeneous societies. What do these findings mean for the wider debate on institutionalizing peace in ethnically divided places? First, and foremost, they refute more extreme arguments against accommodation, such as the assertion that power-sharing inevitably accentuates ethnic divisions. I find no evidence for this expectation. To the contrary, I find that prolonged power-sharing, especially where it rests on inclusive norms or informal coalitions, *reduces* ethnic salience. Second, my findings underline the importance of the specific institutional form whereby power-sharing practices are brought about. Most importantly, they indicate that where power-sharing rests on constitutionally enshrined, explicitly ethnic criteria, it may enhance ethnic salience, by increasing

the cognitive accessibility of ethnic identities. In sum, the results attenuate warnings against the long-term consequences of power-sharing for ethnic divisions, but counsel caution when this is attempted through the institutionalization of rigid, explicitly ethnic criteria.

Literature

Abrams, Dominic & Michael A Hogg (1990) Social Identification, Self-Categorization and Social Influence. *European Review of Social Psychology* 1(1): 195–228.

Afrobarometer Data (1999) *Afrobarometer Rounds 1-6* (http://www.afrobarometer.org).

Ali, Merima, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Boqian Jiang & Abdulaziz B Shifa (2019) Colonial Legacy, State-building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa. *The Economic Journal* 129(619): 1048–1081.

Andeweg, Rudy B (2000) Consociational democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1): 509–536.

Besley, Timothy & Marta Reynal-Querol (2014) The Legacy of Historical Conflict: Evidence from Africa. *American Political Science Review* 108(2): 319–336.

Bochsler, Daniel (2011) It is not how many votes you get, but also where you get them. Territorial determinants and institutional hurdles for the success of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries. *Acta Politica* 46(3): 217–238.

Bogaards, Matthijs (2000) The Uneasy Relationship Between Empirical and Normative Types in Consociational Theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12(4): 395–423.

Bogaards, Matthijs (2019) Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 25(1): 27–42.

Bogaards, Matthijs, Ludger Helms & Arend Lijphart (2019) The Importance of Consociationalism for Twenty-First Century Politics and Political Science. *Swiss Political Science Review* (December) (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12384).

Bormann, Nils-Christian, Lars-Erik Cederman, Scott Gates, Benjamin AT Graham, Simon Hug, Kaare W Strøm & Julian Wucherpfennig (2019) Power Sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(1): 84–100.

Bormann, Nils-Christian, Lars-Erik Cederman & Manuel Vogt (2017) Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(4): 744–771.

Bormann, Nils-Christian, Yannick I Pengl, Lars-Erik Cederman & Nils B Weidmann (2021) Globalization, Institutions, and Ethnic Inequality. *International Organization* 75(3): 665–697.

Brewer, Marilynn B (1997) The social psychology of intergroup relations: can research inform practice? *Journal of Social Issues* 53(1): 197–211.

Brubaker, Rogers, Mara Loveman & Peter Stamatov (2004) Ethnicity as cognition. *Theory and Society* 33(1): 31–64.

Cammett, M & E Malesky (2012) Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(6): 982–1016.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug, Andreas Schädel & Julian Wucherpfennig (2015) Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late? *American Political Science Review* 109(02): 354–370.

Dahl, Robert A (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale.

Dahlberg, Stefan, Aksel Sundström, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Natalia Alvarado Pachon, Cem Mert Dalli & Yente Meijers (2023) *The Quality of Government Basic Dataset, Version Jan23*. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute (https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government).

Deschouwer, Kris (2006) And the peace goes on? Consociational democracy and Belgian politics in the twenty-first century. *West European Politics* 29(5): 895–911.

Dunning, Thad & Lauren Harrison (2010) Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review* 104(01): 21–39.

Dunning, Thad & Janhavi Nilekani (2013) Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils. *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 35–56.

Easterly, William & Ross Levine (1997) Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. 112(4): 1203–1250.

Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel & Daniel N Posner (2010) Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2): 494–510.

Elkins, Zachary & John Sides (2007) Can institutions build unity in multiethnic states? *American Political Science Review* 101(04): 693–708.

Farag, Mahmoud, Hae Ran Jung, Isabella C Montini, Juliette Bourdeau de Fontenay & Satveer Ladhar (2022) What Do We Know about Power Sharing after 50 Years? *Government and Opposition* (August): 1–22.

Fearon, James D & David D Laitin (2000) Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity. *International Organization* 54(04): 845–877.

Flesken, Anaïd (2018) Ethnic Parties, Ethnic Tensions? Results of an Original Election Panel Study. *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4): 967–981.

Germann, Micha & Nicholas Sambanis (2021) Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination. *International Organization* 75(1): 178–203.

Gibler, Douglas M, Marc L Hutchison & Steven V Miller (2012) Individual Identity Attachments and International Conflict: The Importance of Territorial Threat. *Comparative Political Studies* 45(12): 1655–1683.

Gurr, Ted Robert (2002) Attaining peace in divided societies: Five principles of emerging doctrine. *International Journal on World Peace* 27–51.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N Posner & Jeremy M Weinstein (2009) *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Hale, Henry E (2008) *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hartzell, Caroline & Matthew Hoddie (2003) Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 318.

Higashijima, Masaaki & Christian Houle (2018) Ethnic Inequality and the Strength of Ethnic Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Political Behavior* 40(4): 909–932.

Higashijima, Masaaki & Ryo Nakai (2016) Elections, Ethnic Parties, and Ethnic Identification in New Democracies: Evidence from the Baltic States. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 51(2): 124–146.

Hogg, Michael A & Kipling D Williams (2000) From I to We: Social Identity and the Collective Self. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 4(1): 81–97.

Horne, Will, James Adams & Noam Gidron (2022) The Way we Were: How Histories of Co-Governance Alleviate Partisan Hostility. *Comparative Political Studies* (May): 001041402211001.

Hornsey, Matthew J (2008) Social Identity Theory and Self-categorization Theory: A Historical Review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2(1): 204–222.

Horowitz, Donald L (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Horowitz, Donald L (2001) *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Houle, Christian, Paul D Kenny & Chunho Park (2019) The Structure of Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Voting. *The Journal of Politics* 81(1): 187–200.

Huber, John D (2012) Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity? *American Journal of Political Science* 56(4): 986–1001.

Huber, John D & Pavithra Suryanarayan (2016) Ethnic inequality and the ethnification of political parties: Evidence from India. *World Politics* 68(1): 149–188.

Inglehart, Ronald, C Haerpfer, A Moreno, C Welzel, K Kizilova, J Diez-Medrano, M Lagos, Pippa Norris, E Ponarin & B Puranen (2014) *World Values Survey: All Rounds - Country-Pooled Datafile Version.* Madrid: JD Systems Institute (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp).

ISSP Research Group (2010) *International Social Survey Programme: ISSP - National Identity I-III.* Data file Version 1.0.0. Cologne: GESIS Data Archive.

Juon, Andreas (2020) Minorities overlooked: Group-based power-sharing and the exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma. *International Political Science Review* 41(1): 89–107.

Juon, Andreas (2023) Inclusion, Recognition, and Inter-Group Comparisons: The Effects of Power-Sharing Institutions on Grievances. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Kendhammer, Brandon (2015) Getting Our Piece of the National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21(2): 143–165.

Leonard, Melinda A, Branka Damjanovic, Goran Simic & Gul Aldikacti Marshall (2016) Peace Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Effects of Ingroup Identification, Outgroup Trust and Intergroup Forgiveness on Intergroup Contact. *Peace and Conflict Studies* 23(1): 4.

Lieberman, Evan S & Prerna Singh (2012) The institutional origins of ethnic violence. *Comparative Politics* 45(1): 1–24.

Lieberman, Evan S & Prerna Singh (2017) Census Enumeration and Group Conflict. *World Politics* 69(01): 1–53.

Lijphart, Arend (1968) *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lijphart, Arend (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend (2002) The Evolution of Consociational Theory and Consociational Practices, 1965–2000. *Acta Politica* 37: 11–22.

Lijphart, Arend (2004) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy* 15(2): 96–109.

Lijphart, Arend (2008) *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice.* London ; New York: Routledge.

Lindberg, Staffan I, Nils Düpont, Masaaki Higashijima, Yaman Berker Kavasoglu, Kyle L Marquardt, Michael Bernhard, Holger Döring, Allen Hicken, Melis Laebens, Juraj Medzihorsky, Anja Neundorf, Ora John Reuter, Saskia P Ruth-Lovell, Ketih R Weghorst, Nina Wiesehomeier,

Joseph Wright, Nazifa Alizada, Paul Bederke, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Johannes von Römer, Steven Wilson, Daniel Pemstein & Brigitte Seim (2022) *Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party) Dataset V2.* (https://doi.org/10.23696/vpartydsv2).

McCulloch, Allison (2014) Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies: the liberal-corporate distinction. *Democratization* 21(3): 501–518.

McCulloch, Allison (2017) Pathways from Power-sharing. *Civil Wars* 19(4): 405–424.

McGarry, John & B O'Leary (2008) Integration or accommodation? The enduring debate in conflict regulation. In: Sujit Choudhry & Richard Simeon (eds) *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Integration or Accommodation?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 41–90.

McLaughlin, Eric S (2007) Beyond the Racial Census: The Political Salience of Ethnolinguistic Cleavages in South Africa. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(4): 435–456.

McNamee, Lachlan (2019) Indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity. *World Development* 15.

Montalvo, José G & Marta Reynal-Querol (2005) Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars. *The American Economic Review* 95(3): 796–816.

Murtagh, Cera & Allison McCulloch (2021) Beyond the core: Do ethnic parties 'reach out' in power-sharing systems? *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 23(3): 533–551.

Nagle, John (2016) Between entrenchment, reform and transformation: ethnicity and Lebanon's consociational democracy. *Democratization* 23(7): 1144–1161.

Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway (2002) ESS Rounds 1-9 (https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/).

Oakes, Penelope (1987) The Salience of Social Categories. In: John C Turner (ed.) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. B. Blackwell, 117–141.

Østby, G (2008) Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 143–162.

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri & Johannes von Römer (2020) *The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data*. 5th Edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

Petersen, Roger D (2002) *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pildes, Richard H (2008) Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions: A Dynamic Perspective. In: Sujit Choudhry (ed.) *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?* Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 173–204.

Raffoul, Alexandre W (2020) The Politics of Association: Power-Sharing and the Depoliticization of Ethnicity in Post-War Burundi. *Ethnopolitics* 19(1): 1–18.

Ray, Subhasish (2018a) Ethnic Inequality and National Pride: Ethnic Inequality and National Pride. *Political Psychology* 39(2): 263–280.

Ray, Subhasish (2018b) Beyond Divide and Rule: Explaining the Link between British Colonialism and Ethnic Violence. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 24(4): 367–388.

Robinson, Amanda Lea (2014) National Versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of territorial Nationalism. *World Politics* 66(4): 709–746.

Rose, R (2010) *New Europe Barometer I-XV Trend Dataset, 1991-2007*. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Service (http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5241-1).

Rosiny, Stephan (2015) A Quarter Century of 'Transitory Power-Sharing'. Lebanon's Unfulfilled Ta'if Agreement of 1989 Revisited. *Civil Wars* 17(4): 485–502.

Rothchild, Donald & Philip G Roeder (2005) Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies. In: Philip G Roeder & Rothchild (eds) *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1–26.

Samii, Cyrus (2013) Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi. *American Political Science Review* 107(03): 558–573.

Seekings, Jeremy (2008) The continuing salience of race: Discrimination and diversity in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 26(1): 1–25.

Sisk, Timothy D & Christoph Stefes (2005) Power Sharing as an Interim Step in Peace Building: Lessons from Africa. In: Philip G Roeder & Donald Rothchild (eds) *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 293–318.

Stewart, Frances (ed.) (2008) *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies*. Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Turner, John C (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. B. Blackwell.

Vandeginste, Stef (2017) *Exit Arusha? Pathways from Power-Sharing in Burundi. A Manuscript Outline*. Antwerp: University of Antwerp.

Vogt, M, NC Bormann, S Rüegger, LE Cederman, P Hunziker & L Girardin (2015) Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327–1342.

Weber, Max (1978) *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (eds). Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Wimmer, Andreas (2008) The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: A multilevel process theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 113(4): 970–1022.

Wimmer, Andreas (2017) Power and Pride: National Identity and Ethnopolitical Inequality around the World. *World Politics* 69(4): 605–639.

Wolff, Stefan (2011) Post-Conflict State Building: the debate on institutional choice. *Third World Quarterly* 32(10): 1777–1802.

Wucherpfennig, Julian, Philipp Hunziker & Lars-Erik Cederman (2016) Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule and Postcolonial Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4): 882–898.

Zuber, Christina Isabel & Edina Szöcsik (2015) Ethnic outbidding and nested competition: Explaining the extremism of ethnonational minority parties in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 54(4): 784–801.